China Naval Visit in Cambodia: Strategic Naval Diplomacy in Asia-Pacific

Port Call in Sihanoukville: China’s Naval Diplomacy on the Rise

Mohd Hanif Ismail - : Oct 17, 2025 - : 8:36 am

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In a move that blends soft power with strategic signalling, two Chinese naval vessels — the amphibious warfare ship Yimeng Shan and the training ship Qijiguang — recently made a “friendship and training” port call in Sihanoukville, Cambodia. Docking at the city’s commercial harbour rather than the upgraded Ream Naval Base, the visit is portrayed by Beijing and Phnom Penh as a symbol of naval cooperation and regional solidarity. However, observers see deeper currents at work: a recalibration of influence in Southeast Asia and a test of regional responses to China’s maritime ambitions.

According to a report by the Associated Press, the two warships arrived in early October, intending to stay briefly before proceeding to other Southeast Asian ports. Phnom Penh officials emphasise that the visit is not aimed at backing Cambodia in its recent border tensions with Thailand, but rather at building technical and logistical ties between the two navies. Nevertheless, the choice to anchor at a civilian port — as opposed to Ream — appears calculated, perhaps to assuage concerns about a military footprint.

China’s overture aligns with a broader pattern of military diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific, where naval port calls, joint exercises and infrastructure investment form essential tools of influence. For Cambodia, the visit reinforces long-standing defence cooperation with Beijing. China has financed the expansion of the Ream Naval Base, including new piers and a dry dock — a project completed in 2025 that has drawn scrutiny from the United States and its allies over the prospect of a quasi-Chinese naval outpost. Phnom Penh insists that the base remains under Cambodian sovereignty and open to all friendly navies. In April 2025, for instance, two Japanese minesweepers became the first foreign vessels to dock at Ream since the upgrade, a move interpreted as a signal of Phnom Penh’s desire to deflect claims of exclusive Chinese use.

The visit comes at a time of heightened volatility in the Indo-Pacific theatre. Southeast Asia faces overlapping pressures: China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, a resurging US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and renewed naval activity by Australia, Japan and India. Last month, an Australian frigate, HMAS Ballarat, also docked in Sihanoukville — underscoring how Cambodia has become a nodal port in the contest for naval presence. Moreover, Beijing has recently conducted bold naval forays far beyond its traditional zone, such as live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea in 2025, testing how mid-ocean naval deployments are received by regional powers.

For trade and commerce, the implications are subtle but important. The Gulf of Thailand, into which Sihanoukville and Ream open, is a gateway to the South China Sea and, ultimately, to the Malacca Strait — one of the world’s busiest chokepoints. Every shift in naval posture or port access influences the calculus of sea control, freedom of navigation and security in vital shipping lanes. China’s growing navy now seeks not just dominance in its near seas but legitimacy in broader regional waters. In that context, friendship visits like this one serve dual ends: signalling to regional states that China is not a confrontational power, while reinforcing maritime logistics and command reach.

Still, questions remain. Will Cambodia host Chinese warships more frequently? Will other nations — notably the US, Japan, India and Australia — treat this pattern as precedent or provocation? How might ASEAN navies react — by hedging or aligning? For exporters, shipping firms and investors, developments in naval access and port diplomacy are more than strategic posturing; they ripple through trade routes, port security regimes and insurance risk assessments.

As China continues expanding its naval diplomacy network, the Sihanoukville visit is more than a goodwill gesture — it is a chess move in an evolving maritime order across the Asia-Pacific.