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through deploying Shandong. These warga- Taiwan without having to wage full-scale war. Koh noted that the
mes demonstrated that the PLA Navy is a much PLA’s recent exercise took place in peacetime and without active
better-resourced and coordinated outfit com- Taiwanese resistance. “In a real wartime scenario, a PLA air and naval
pared, to say, the Taiwan Strait crises in the blockade has no guaranteed means of success given the threat
1990s. The ability to surge naval and air assets posed by Taiwan’s air, naval and missile forces. In other words, you
in significant quantity at short notice for these can expect the PLA blockade to be contested, and Beijing’s military
manoeuvres speaks of the PLA’s growing criti- planners have to seek to neutralise those defensive elements that
cal mass of platforms…” Koh further observed: the island can tap, likely in conjunction with the US and potentially
“There are signs of better coordination between also regional allies like Japan.”
the PLA services, which can be attributed to
past reforms undertaken. The PLA forces are The Singaporean academic concluded: “Therefore, the wargames
still learning the ropes of force integration and against Taiwan may not have truly manifested the real challenges
joint operations, and the Taiwan contingencies that the PLA may face in times of war; it no longer suffices to just
provide the opportunity to refine such training.” deploy forces to encircle the island, because they’ll be challenged
by Taiwan, the US and her allies throughout the Western Pacific the-
Such exercises are part of China’s “silkworm atre – not just a localised campaign zone around Taiwan.” Taiwan’s
eating” strategy, whereby China inexorably Deputy Foreign Minister Roy Chun Lee agreed that China is more
reduces Taiwan’s space for manoeuvre. In 2022, likely to economically blockade Taiwan than to launch an all-out
China sent 1,727 fighters, bombers and UAVs into military invasion. Lee said Taipei’s planning to respond to a blockade
Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, com- had begun, and that stockpiling of critical materials and products
pared to 960 intrusions in 2021 and 380 in 2020. has accelerated over the past two years.

Unfortunately, action-reaction dynamics in the A US Indo-Pacific Command briefing slide viewed by Asian Defence
Taiwan Strait are rising, with both blatant mili- Technology starkly listed the consequences of China assimilating
tary threats and grey zone tactics from China. Taiwan by force or otherwise. China would gain: a major “rejuvena-
One example was China’s April announcement tion” victory; extraordinary new legitimacy for Xi and the party; an
from maritime law enforcement that it would ideological win over democracy, freedom and the West; assimilation
board civilian vessels in the Taiwan Strait during of a major economy; confidence in pursuing other territorial claims;
a three-day operation to “ensure the safety new strategic advantages in projecting military power; domination
of vessel navigation”. This operation did not near global sea lanes and chokepoints; control over Taiwan’s critical
proceed, but it illustrates China’s intention to technology (e.g. semiconductors); greater international deference
control even the high seas. Another instance to China’s comprehensive national power; and momentum for new
was Chinese vessels damaging two sea cables forms of assertiveness.
near Taiwan’s Matsu Islands in February, cutting
off the internet. Such intimidating measures by For many years, the USA has been observing Taiwanese exercises,
China will only intensify in the future. Chairman rendering technical assistance and assessing Taiwanese defence
Xi Jinping has shown himself to be an authori- preparations, and these American efforts are intensifying. Taiwan will
tarian bully, and its warmongering and military extend compulsory military service for all males to a one-year period
threats are utterly shocking. beginning in 2024. The USA remains a stalwart supplier of weapons
to Taiwan too. For example, Taipei is buying 400 Harpoon missiles for
mobile coastal batteries. These weapons illustrate Taiwan’s efforts
Appetite for Risk to accelerate asymmetric warfare capabilities to deter China with
Of course, posturing is part of China’s rhet- the spectre of a bloody invasion. The US Navy conducted its most
oric, designed to make Taiwan and its allies recent transit of the Taiwan Strait with USS Milius on 16 April, the
give up, since Xi would obviously like to seize second of the year. Ten such transits occurred in 2022, twelve in
2021, and 15 in 2020.

© Gordon Arthur
China’s coercive policies are only worsening the situation, creating
a serious risk that actions against Taiwan – whether grey zone or
military – will escalate into wider regional tensions or even conflict,
drawing in the USA, Japan and Australia, for example. Taiwan is a
strategic challenge with a military dimension, but it is not solely a
military challenge.

Nonetheless, Xi is intent on raising the perceived risk to intolerable
levels for anyone who might dare to intervene in a cross-Strait con-
flict. The PLA wants to keep the US military at arm’s length and to
isolate Taiwan. Many Chinese quote the idiom that when the melon
is ripe, it will fall from the tree; this implies that China believes it still
has time on its side.
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