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It notes, “the operator’s failure to ensure that its flight crews performance issues.
were prepared to properly respond to uncommanded stabilizer
trim movement in the manner outlined in Boeing’s flight crew It states that it “considers that the operational
operating manual (FCOM) bulletin and the FAA’s emergency and crew performance aspects are insuffi-
airworthiness directive (AD) (both issued 4 months before the ciently addressed in the EAIB final report,
accident).” The NTSB said that the “EAIB report includes multiple in particular with regard to the sequence of
findings that question the functionality of the manual electric events that occurred before the activation of
trim system but presents no facts to support these findings. In the 1st MCAS. Consequently, this prevents the
addition, the findings contradict the evidence from this investi- reader from having a precise and complete
gation indicating that the system was functioning as intended.” understanding of the event.”
The NTSB said that “the EAIB report incorrectly states that “Shortcomings relating to the crew’s actions,
design changes to the 737-8 MAX were not official and were particularly in the first phase of the flight, is
not approved by the FAA and it incorrectly states that Boeing not accompanied by a thorough analysis of
did not respond or failed to respond appropriately to Ethiopian the reasons for the behaviours observed, in
Airlines’ request for more information about the MCAS after the relation with their training, their experience
Lion Air accident.” The EAIB report also inappropriately states and the company organization with regard to
that the IAS (indicated airspeed) DISAGREE, and ALT (altitude) the training and knowledge acquisition prin-
DISAGREE messages were not displayed to the crew during the ciples,” the BEA said.
accident flight, and the EAIB used this incorrect assumption as
a basis for its assessment of the crew’s performance. The French investigator said its “following
comments represent important points that
The EAIB draft report also incorrectly states (in several locations) the BEA considers necessary to take into
that the MCAS made control of the airplane “impossible” but account in order to have a comprehensive
neglects to state that, if the crew had manually reduced thrust and balanced report” and it publicly called for
and appropriately used the manual electric trim, the airplane its document be appended to the Final Report.
would have remained controllable despite uncommanded MCAS
input. The BEA said that it “believes that the crew’s
inadequate actions and the insufficient
The NTSB and BEA both said that “the EAIB report inaccurately Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) played
states that the crew performed actions “per the procedure.” a role in the chain of events that led to the
Evidence shows that the crew did not appropriately perform accident, in particular during the first phase
non-normal procedures after receiving annunciations relating of the flight, before the first MCAS activation.”
to unreliable airspeed, stall warning, and runaway stabilizer. The BEA noted that the contributing factors identi-
crew also did not respond as expected to the overspeed warning fied by the EAIB are only related to the MCAS
by disconnecting the auto throttle and reducing power.” system and it lists contributing factors, that
come out of the analysis of the event, that
On its website the BEA said that “from the very start of the should also be in the report.
investigation, under the authority of the Ethiopian AIB and in
cooperation with the NTSB and their technical advisers, actively These are:
participated in the understanding and the analysis of the aircraft
systems, the operational aspects of the occurrence and the crew 1.Flight crew’s failure to apply, immediately

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