Page 7 - AAA MARCH - APRIL 2019 Online Magazine

bit like the cruise control on your car. If you get
a surge of power for some reason you put your
foot on the brake, you don’t troubleshoot the
problem. Another great example is an engine
fire – the pilot doesn’t need to know what part
of the engine is on fire or why he just needs to
kill the fire.”

The training captain highlights an earlier AoA
issue on the A320 where it was icing up. “The
320’s were icing up and clever pilots knew
exactly what to do with this thing when it hap-
pened. It was icing up at about 19,000ft and
the airplane pitched down responding to the
erroneous data.” “Now in Boeing’s case if it
does that [pitch down] you uncap the switches
and switch the stabilizer trim off. On the Airbus
what you do is to switch two computers off to
stop the computer from taking control, so you
go to a more manual phase.”

Asking Questions
Former senior air safety investigator with the
National Transportation Safety Board, Greg
Feith, also questions the flying skills and train- crash were successful in recognizing the anomalous airspeed and
ing of the pilots in the Lion Air and Ethiopian stall warning indications and they took the appropriate corrective
crashes. “United Airlines stated after the Lion actions to successfully complete their respective flights – yet the
Air accident that their training program for the accident flight crew failed to take the proper corrective actions.
737MAX was robust and that their pilots were
thoroughly trained,’’ he says. “Over the past few “When that investigation is completed, I believe improper actions
days [after the Ethiopian crash], US carriers by maintenance personnel and the accident flight crew will be the
who stood behind the airplane also expressed prominent causal factors.” Feith says that “in the coverage of both
confidence in their respective training pro- accidents virtually no one is talking about the pilots, nor the airlines
grams for the MAX and the pilots who fly them.” involved, nor the training, nor the experience of the pilots”. “It is
well beyond time that these direct factors are understood, inves-
“So, the question that needs to be asked and tigated and considered a possible contributor to the two distinct
investigated is how thorough and robust is the MAX accidents.”
737MAX pilot training program at Ethiopian
Airlines [and Lion Air], what was the training Feith says the Ethiopian captain’s 8000 hours total time is one thing
history of the two accident pilots, how much but “how much time in type is the real question.” “Ethiopian does
time-in-type did they both have? not have many of these model airplanes currently in service and
the accident airplane was delivered in November.,’’ he says. “Thus,
“Lastly what is the expectation and compe- one question is how many hours did both pilots have in the actual
tence level of a 200-hour F/O in the Ethiopian airplane since they completed training. A 200-hour F/O begs the
crash and if the captain had very limited time in questions about the training program and how much the F/O could
the MAX, his competence level as well,” Feith really contribute with very limited experience.”
told AirlineRatings.com. “I think the Lion Air
accident is a good example – the pilots who However, Representative Peter A. DeFazio, Democrat of Oregon
flew the accident aircraft in the days before the and the chairman of the US House transportation committee, told

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