Page 8 - AAA MARCH - APRIL 2019 Online Magazine
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the New York Times this past weekend that when he asked the
          RACING TO MARKET                           FAA after the Lion Air crash why more substantial training was not
                                                     required he was told that it based its rules for training around the
                                                     typical experience of a pilot in the United States, explaining that
                                                     “the average caliber, skill, and training of U.S. pilots is extensive,
                                                     with countless hours of flight time and training both on the flight
                                                     deck and in simulators.” DeFazio said that “overseas pilots, in some
                                                     cases, have a tiny fraction of the training that our pilots have.”

                                                     Increased Automation
                                                     Feith also highlights automation paralysis. “In the Atlas Air 767 crash
                                                     last month, the autopilot and auto-throttle were both engaged when
                                                     it crashed. The issue that is becoming clear is that these ‘children
                                                     of the magenta line’ don’t know when to disconnect automation
          Reports that Boeing rushed the development   and fly the plane,” says Feith. “We are finding that when ‘an issue’
          of the 737 MAX are not correct. In fact, the   develops the pilots are waiting too long to intervene or not inter-
          opposite is the case with the design and pro-
          duction being one of the longest in Boeing’s   vening at all and a benign situation quickly becomes catastrophic.
          commercial  jet  history.  Boeing  designed   In both MAX accidents it was daylight and clear skies. Put the nose
          and built the all-new 747, plus the factory   on the horizon and fly the plane manually, what could be simpler?”
          to assemble it, in just under four years from
          initial concepts whereas the 737 MAX a deriv-  In the case of the Ethiopian accident the airline’s CEO, Tewolde
          ative of an existing design, was launched late   Gebremariam told CNN’s Richard Quest that both pilots had gone
          in 2011 and didn’t fly till early 2016 – 4.5 years   through additional training related to MCAS software after the
          later. Trade-off studies of a derivative versus   Lion Air accident. Feith then asks: “So why didn’t they switch off
          an all-new design for the MAX started a year   the runaway stabilizer trim?” Feith also highlights the amount of
          earlier. The 737 MAX then went through a   flying some low-cost airlines are forcing their pilots to perform.
          2,000-hour flight test program and also a 180-  Some pilots are flying 110 hours a month. They are overworked
          minute ETOPS testing that required 3,000
          simulated flight cycles. In fact, the 737 MAX   and fatigue is a big issue,” he says.
          took longer to design and certify than any
          other 737 model or major upgrade.          Last year Frank Caron, who was brought in as Lion Air’s safety
                                                     manager from 2009 to 2011 on orders from insurance firms, told the
          The original model was conceived in early   New York Times that the airline had an average of one major engi-
          1964 and first flew in early 1967, while the   neering issue every three days, even though most of its fleet was
          Classic 737 series was launched in late 1979   new. “Buying all the latest-generation, state-of-the-art engineer-
          and flew in 1984. The next model was the   ing will be in vain if you don’t have systems in place that prioritize
          737NG which was launched in 1993 and first   safety,” he told the NYT. Caron said that pilot logbooks drastically
          flew four years later in 1997.
                                                     understated the number of hours pilots actually worked. “What I
                                                     saw was a company, from the top down, that made saving money a
          Even all new designs like the 757 and 777
          have taken less time than the 737 MAX to   motto — so spend the minimum on pilot training, salaries, manage-
          develop and build. The Boeing 757 devel-   ment, everything,” he said. Caron told Reuters that “safety is much
          opment was four years and was launched in   more than running concepts and procedures, safety is a spirit, a
          1978 and flew in early 1982 while the 777 was
          just over four years being kicked off late in
          1989 and flew in early 1994. Only the Boeing
          787 took longer due to complications with an
          all-new production system and new materials.

          The Airbus A320neo – the direct competitor
          to the 737 MAX – had a shorter development
          time. It was launched in December 2010, and
          made its first flight on September 25, 2014,
          just four years later. Both major manufactur-
          ers are always playing catch up with each
          other as each brings out new technology.

          In the case of both the 737MAX and A320neo,
          the pacing item has actually been the engine
          makers that have struggled to keep up with
          demand for the two twin-jets.



        8 | March/April 2019                                                       WWW .GBP .COM.SG/ AAA
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