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Data Does not Lie tural factors, when a pilot was under pressure,
That view reflected a comprehensive NASA Research Center study could not always be eliminated by training. He
based on Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine data by also raised the issue of the speed with which
Dr. Marianne Rudisill in 1995 that surveyed more than 1,000 pilots copilots are reaching captain status, with some
from 20 airlines and aircraft manufacturers about pilots’ attitudes gaining the left seat in four years with fewer
and experience with flight deck automation. The strength of the than 3,000 hr. as first officers. “Can we really
study was that most respondents had flown aircraft from basic believe that these youngsters have mastered
cockpit types like 727s through to Glass 2 types such as A320s the skills necessary in this time?’ he asked.
and 747-400s.
He added: “In some respects, automated air-
It found the general consensus was that “safety is increased with craft may require a higher standard of basic
automation but automation may lend a false sense of security, stick and rudder skills, if only because these
particularly with inexperienced pilots.” Pilots reported that there skills are practiced less often and may be called
was a higher sense of “insecurity” during an automation failure upon in the most demanding emergency situ-
and a general temptation to ignore raw information and “follow ations.” But 10 years later, it would appear the
the green/magenta line.” The most worrying aspect was that pilots opposite is the case with a significant deterio-
said their colleagues were “becoming complacent and relied too ration of flying skills.
much on the automation but that was often because airline SoPs
mandated reliance on automation.” Not only do Boeing and Airbus have a problem
but the entire industry has a problem if it is
USAF Maj. Charles Spencer Jr., in a 2000 paper on cockpit auto- to double in size in the next 15 years. Do the
mation and mode confusion that combined Rudisill’s findings, aircraft manufacturers have to go back to the
subsequent works and his own 20 years in civil flying in automated drawing board and design aircraft cockpits for
and nonautomated aircraft, found “mode confusion” to be a major a lower pilot skill and training level that we are
issue and claimed that “ergonomic design has not kept up with now seeing?
cockpit design.”
On that issue, Meshkati again
He found that pilots misunderstand the behavior of cockpit auto- “URGES SAFETY REGULATORS TO
mation and that; “usually the result is a benign inconvenience, but TAKE THE LEAD IN DEVELOPING A
it has occasionally ended in tragedy.” His paper called for a new MORE SAFETY-FOCUSED CULTURE
approach to alerting pilots with a four-tiered aural system.
TO IMPROVE BASIC AIRMANSHIP,
Flying Skills AS TECHNOLOGY BY ITSELF
Airbus VP-Training Jacques Drappier, in a 2009 presentation on CANNOT SOLVE OR REMOVE
the subject of erosion of manual flying skills in highly automated ALL HUMAN FACTORS FROM THE
aircraft, again just before AF447, said the jury is out on the subject.
SAFETY EQUATION.”
“From a safety standpoint automation gives a maximum of safety.
However, it must go alongside manual flying skills,’’ he said. “We
must maintain these flying skills and the way is through training.”
However, Asiana OZ214 was a wakeup call to the industry that cul-
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