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“Where is the quality control of the interview, selection and due
diligence process in these cases? Why, when the six-monthly
checks expose low standards, are they permitted to remain
employed with no remedial training recorded leading to a doc-
umented improvement in flying ability,” questions Leahy et al. A
former check and training captain from a major manufacturer
told Asian Airlines and Aerospace that there was deep concern
about the skill level of pilots being trained with a “just good
enough” attitude prevailing. Another manufacturer said it had
profound concerns about some airlines that didn’t want their
training as it was “too expensive.” Capt. Leahy and his fellow
pilots from RAeS FOG are also concerned about the level of
manual flying training at various airlines.

“Manual Flying skills are those where the pilot can manage safe
flight without the use of any automation. Commonly called” stick
and rudder” skills these relate to the ability to control the aircraft
manually without any visual cues such as a visible horizon, using
only standard flight instruments and this relies on extensive train-
ing. “IFR pilots are also trained to disregard confusing cues such
as G forces and other sensory illusions. Combined, these binary
skills are the foundation stone of all commercial pilot training
and have been for decades,” says Capt. Leahy.

Safety Bureau, which lead the investigation at But he asks are they still being trained?
the invitation of the Singaporean authorities, “The truth is that it is very hard to know since each jurisdiction,
attributed the skill of the crew in saving the regulator, school and airline have a great deal of latitude in
A380. While, by chance, there were five pilots formulating training programmes but what we do know is that
on the flight deck the crew followed two-crew many schools and airlines excel at training.”
procedures of the pilot flying, controlling the
A380 while the no-flying pilot dealt with the
ECAM fault messages. Too Toxic for Discussion
Capt. Leahy says that during the initial studies, the team did
Settling For Less include the two MAX crashes among the sad tally of what they
considered avoidable crashes, attributable in part to poor train-
Reflecting the pressure on airlines of a pilot ing. As time went by, our views, shared by many here at the FOG,
shortage Leahy et. al. notes the poor stan- were gradually rejected by world opinion which was informed by
dards at initial induction of pilots. Congressional enquiries, Boeing’s admissions of culpability, a
tidal wave of revulsion and even a Netflix full-length docu-drama
“A trend we noted during our study of histor- “Boeing, the Downfall”.
ical accident reports was the employment,
by some carriers, of pilots with a history of “To mention, even softly, that the pilots of those two aircraft, in
poor flying ability. Some pilots had even been particular, were in any way deficient, or even to question their
dismissed by other carriers yet this was no training, became unspeakable. It became shameful to even men-
impediment to these pilots joining another tion that another Lionair crew the previous day had flown the very
airline shortly afterwards,” it stated. Worse, same aircraft with the self-same MCAS encounter successfully
claims the report “other pilots carry on work- from Bali to Jakarta. The crash the next day was not therefore
ing within an airline despite repeatedly failing inevitable,” argues Capt. Leahy.
(or barely passing) and needing to repeat He adds that “some experts felt that even if our views were cor-
annual mandatory simulator or other checks, rect, and many did, it was a lost cause and it was time to move
or underperform by other measures. These on. So, we removed the Max crashes from our list of human factor
pilots then remain employed up to the time of events. But it didn’t end there.”
the final fatal crash even though there is an
adverse document trail leading back to their Capt. Leahy says that “some of us held fast to our belief that
initial employment.” to blame Boeing 100 per cent for the twin crashes would have
closed the door on the possibility that the training of those pilots
Classic cases it notes are those of Atlas 3591, was at least a factor. Perhaps a major factor and not just at
a Boeing 767 in 2019, and Helios 522 and it those two airlines. We still believed that by only blaming Boeing,
warns there are many more. poor training leading to inadequate performance as a possible

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